Testing if two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext is an interesting cryptographic primitive. It is usually referred to as equality test of encrypted data or equality test. Abstract. Testing if two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext is an interesting cryptographic primitive. It is usually referred to as equality test of encrypted data or equality test. One of attractive applications of equality test is for encrypted database systems, where the database server hosts the encrypted databases and users can query if the plaintext embedded in a ciphertext on a database is equal to that in the queried ciphertext without decryption. Although it is not hard to achieve with the pairing-based cryptography, the security against the insider attack (by the database server) is a challenging task. In this paper, we propose a novel equality test scheme aiming to solve the problem. Our scheme adopts the identity-based cryptography. We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model.
Introduction
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) [14] is an interesting technique with wide applications such as in outsourced database systems, which host and manage encrypted data for clients. The merit of the equality test scheme is that one can check whether two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext without decrypting them.
In the original equality test scheme [14] , outsourced database servers are usually considered to be semi-trusted because of its curiosity on user data. We call it an "Honest but Curious" (HBC) server. It is practical for the server to obtain the illegal profit from peddling users' private data by simple brute force attacks on the encrypted message. Our scheme should resist this kind of adversaries, even we assume that the adversary has access to all ciphertexts and can test their equality, which is called "insider attack" [11] . An HBC server (the insider), who runs the test algorithm correctly and continuously, can perform any polynomial time computation and then obtain the information beyond its own.
Related Work
Boneh et al. first proposed a public key encryption with keyword search scheme (PEKS) in the random oracle model [2] . When a user conducts a search, he can generate a trapdoor with a keyword and his private key. Taking the generated trapdoor and a ciphertext, the test algorithm will output "accept" if they contain the same keyword; otherwise, "reject". Their work provides a solution to the equality test on encrypted keywords in public key encryption.
To provide a general equality test scheme, Yang et al. proposed the first public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) [14] . In PKEET, given two tags T i and T j on ciphertexts C i and C j generated with P K i and P K j corresponding to message M i and M j , respectively, there is a function Test(·, ·), which outputs 1 iff M i = M j . Their work achieves the security against the One-way Chosen Ciphertext Attack (OW-CCA). There are some extensions of PKEET which offer the fine or flexible grain authorization and stronger security [13, 12, 6, 9, 10, 8] . To achieve the stronger security, the authorization mechanism is adopted to these PKEET schemes. Some of them utilize trapdoors generated from private keys which are used to the authorization process. As an instance, Ma et al. in [9] , proposed a PKEET with the flexible authorization according to four scenarios. In [10] , Ma et al. provided a solution to the PKEET in multi-user setting by delegating the equality test to a fully trusted proxy. Later, Ma [8] proposed an identity-based PKEET (IBEET). These works improved the security of PKEET to IND-CCA security, while private keys are kept secret. However, none of their works can resist the insider attack.
Mayer et al. [11] proposed a verifiable private equality test (VPET) for multiparty computation. The protocol resists attacks launched by HBC entities and active malicious entities who can behave active malicious actions. However, it requires that all users are online during testing and generate a proof for each equality test. It is therefore impractical for the cloud storage management and outsourced database services, which require users to be offline. Constructions presented in [7, 3] also provide solutions to insider attacks for the PEKS schemes, but not for the general equality test. Chen et al. in [3] proposed a PEKS scheme based on the dual-server framework. Peng et al. [7] proposed a PEKS scheme to prevent the trapdoor generated globally by containing identity set in trapdoors by keeping this set secret, so that the insider attack is eliminated.
Our Contribution
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test was proposed by Yang et al. [14] . However, their scheme is vulnerable to the above insider attack. Since the ciphertext can be generated publicly, the HBC server can test the embedded message in the target ciphertext on its guess. To address this problem, we propose an efficient identity-based equality test scheme with resistance against the insider attack as our contributions. We define a novel security model for the confidentiality of IBEET which allows the adversary to conduct the equality test on all ciphertexts but can not generate ciphertexts. We refer it to as Weak-IND-ID-CCA (W-IND-ID-CCA). Nevertheless, it is stronger than security models for previous works under the same attack.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some preliminaries for our construction. In Section 3, we formulate the notion of IBEET-IA. In Section 4, we present the construction of IBEET-IA and prove its security in Section 5. In Section 6, we construct a secure outsourced database application based on IBEET-IA and present the experimental results. In Section 7, we conclude our paper.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairing
Definition 1 (Bilinear Group [5] ). G 1 , G 2 and G T constitute a bilinear group if there exists a bilinear map e :
The bilinear pairing is an operation conducted on bilinear groups. Informally, two elements in such group are linearly related to the pairing result. The formal description of the bilinear paring is given as follows.
Bilinear Pairing Suppose that G 1 , G 2 and G T are three cyclic groups with the same prime order p. Suppose that g and h are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T holds properties as follows:
1. Bilinearity: For any x ∈ G 1 , y ∈ G 2 and a, b ∈ Z * p , e(x a , y b ) = e(x, y) ab . 2. Non-degeneration: e(g, h) = 1 G T , where 1 G T is the generator of G T . 3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(x, y), for any x ∈ G 1 and y ∈ G 2 .
We say that a pairing is symmetric if G 1 = G 2 . Our construction is built on such groups.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). Let G 1 , G 2 be two groups of prime order p. Let e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map and let g be a generator of
where the probability is over the random choice of (a, b, c) ∈ Z Definition 2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption). We say that the BDH assumption holds if for any randomized polynomial time in λ for some sufficiently large λ algorithm A solves the BDH problem with the negligible advantage (λ).
Short Signature without Random Oracle
Recall that the short signature scheme in plain model is proposed by Boneh and Boyen [1] . The security of their scheme depends on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
where the probability is over the random choice of x in Z * p and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 3 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption). We say that the q-SDH assumption holds if for any randomized polynomial time in λ for some sufficiently large λ algorithm A solves the q-SDH problem with the negligible advantage (λ).
Construction. We adopt the weak construction of their short signature. It's sufficient to guarantee the secure of our scheme from the attack by forging an invalid pair of elements and testing with other valid ciphertexts. We recall their construction which consists of three algorithm (KeyGen, Sign, Vefiry).
-KeyGen. Pick random x ∈ Z p , and compute v = g x 2 ∈ G 2 . The public key is (g 1 , g 2 , v). The secret key is x.
-Sign. Given a secret key x and a message m ∈ Z p , output the signature
By convention in this context we define 1/0 to be 0 so that in the unlikely event that x + m = 0 we have ← 1.
-Verify. Given a public key (g 1 , g 2 , v), a message m ∈ Z p , and a signature σ ∈ G 1 , verify that e(σ, v · g 
Definitions
In this section, we give formal definitions of our scheme and security model. Our scheme achieves chosen ciphertext security (i.e. W-IND-ID-CCA) under the defined security model.
ID-based Encryption with Equality Test against Insider Attack
We propose an ID-based encryption with equality test. The scheme Ω consists of a set of algorithms: Ω = (Setup, Extract, Join, Enc, Test, Dec).
-Setup(1 λ ): It takes the secure parameter λ and outputs the system public parameters pp, the master secret key msk.
-Extract(ID, msk): It takes (ID, msk) and pp and outputs the private key d ID .
-Join({ID}): It takes a set of identities {ID} and outputs a group token tok via a secure protocol. -Enc(m, ID, P pub , tok): It takes (m, ID, tok, P pub ) and outputs the ciphertext Note: pp refers to public parameters and hash functions used in our scheme.
Security Models Definition 4 (Weak-IND-ID-CCA (W-IND-ID-CCA)).
Let Ω = (Setup, Extract, Join, Enc, Test, Dec) be the scheme and A be a polynomial time adversary.
-Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to initialize the system and obtains P pub , msk and the challenged group token tok. It gives P pub to the adversary A. -Phase 1: The adversary issues queries q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m where q i is one of:
• -Challenge: Once A decides the Phase 1 is over, it sends two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 and ID * to be challenged to the challenger, where both m 0 , m 1 are not issued in the Encryption Query and ID * is not issued in the Extract Query in the Phase 1. The challenger randomly picks b ∈ {0, 1}, and responds with C * ← Enc(m b , ID * , P pub , tok). -Phase 2:The adversary issues queries q m+1 , q m+2 , · · · , q n where q i is one of:
• H 1 Query (ID i ). The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
• Extract Query (ID i ) where ID i = ID * . The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
• H 2 Query (G We define A's advantage on breaking the scheme as
where (λ) is a polynomial of λ. Ω is W-IND-ID-CCA secure if (λ) is a negligible function. In the W-IND-ID-CCA model, the adversary has access to ciphertexts without any valid tok.
The Proposed Scheme
ID-based Encryption with Equality Test against Insider Attack
Our scheme aims to provide the service for designated senders. That is, the receiver and its designated senders form a group of users. tok denotes a secret information shared among group members. The server and other users can only conduct the equality test. Our protocol consists of the following five algorithms:
-Setup(1 λ ): Initially, the system takes a security parameter λ and returns public system parameters pp, the master secret key msk.
1. The system generates two multiplicative groups G 1 and G 2 with the same prime order p of λ-length bits and a bilinear map e :
The system selects an arbitrary generator g ∈G 1 . 2. The system selects α $ ← Z * p as msk and sets P pub = g α . 3. The system chooses three hash functions:
where l is the length of random numbers and t is the length of messages. It publishes pp = {λ, p, t, l, g, P pub , e, H, H 1 , H 2 }.
-Extract(ID, msk): PKG generates d ID for each user's ID.
where d ID is distributed via a secure channel. -Join({ID}). Users organize a small group and share a common secret token tok = β via a secure protocol.
-
Finally, it returns C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ).
and
are generated by user A and user B, respectively. With 
it returns m. Otherwise, ⊥.
Correctness
We say that Ω has the ciphertext comparability with error µ, for some function µ(·). For instance, we run the equality test on C A ← Enc(m A , ID A , P pub , tok), C B ← Enc(m B , ID B , P pub , tok) generated by user A and user B, respectively. 
Security
Our scheme is a chosen ciphertext secure IBEET (i.e. W-IND-ID-CCA), assuming BDH is hard in groups generated by a BDH parameter generator. Proof. Suppose there is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A who achieves the advantage on breaking Ω = (Setup, Join, Extract, Enc, Test, Dec). Given a BDH instance, a PPT adversary B will take advantage of A to solve the BDH problem with the probability of . Hence, if the BDH assumption holds, then is negligible and consequently must be negligible.
Assume B holds a BDH tuple (g, U, V, R), where x = log g U , y = log g V and z = log g R are unkown. Let g be the generator of G 1 . Finally, B is supposed to output e(g, g)
xyz ∈ G 2 . The game between B and A runs as follows: 
IDi , c i,
• B queries O H2 to obtain 1 , c i,2 , c i,3 , c i,4 ). -Decryption Query. A queries C i to be decrypted in ID i . B responds as follows:
• e(c i,3 , d IDi ) = e(g ri,2 , g aixr ) = e(g, U ) ri,2air .
• z directly from D out by removing first 3k bits (the elements in G 1 and G 2 is k bits length.) that is c * 1
z (a * r)
Claim. If the algorithm B does not abort during the simulation then the algorithm A's view is identical to its view in the real attack. Furthermore, if B does not abort then Pr
. The probability over the random bits used by A, B and the challenger.
It remains to bound the probability that B aborts during the simulation. The algorithm B could abort for three reasons: (1) a bad private key extraction query from A during the phase 1 or 2, (2) A chooses a bad ID to be challenged on, or (3) a bad decryption query from A during the phase 1 or 2. We define three corresponding events: ε 1 : B aborts at the Extract Query step. ε 2 : B aborts at the Decryption Query step. ε 3 : B aborts at the Challenge step.
We have
We provide the proof on Pr[¬ε 1 ∧ ¬ε 2 ∧ ¬ε 3 ] by induction on the maximum number of queries q e + q d made by the adversary. Let ε 0···i be the event that ε 1 ∨ ε 2 ∨ ε 3 happens after A queries at most i times and let i = q e + q d . Similarly, let ε i be the event that ε 1 ∨ ε 2 ∨ ε 3 happens for the first time when A queries the i th item. For i = 0, it is trivial that Pr[
Hence, we bound the probability of ε i not to happen with A's i th query. The query is either an Extract Query for ID i or a Decryption Query for (C i , ID i ). Recall that if coin i = 1 it cannot cause ε 1 and ε 2 to happen. We consider three cases: To summarize, we have
whatever the i th query is. Therefore,
the success probability is maximum at δ opt . Using δ opt = 1 qe+q d +1 , the probability that B does not abort is at least 1 e(qe+q d +1) . This shows that B's advantage is at least e(qe+q d +1) as required. Remark 1. Suppose the q-SDH assumption holds in (G 1 , G 2 ). Then the signature scheme above is secure against existential forgery under a weak chosen message attack. The proof is referred to [1] . The security of the simple construction in [1] implies the security of our construction. If the construction is secure against existential forgery under a weak chosen message attack, our construction is secure under the W-IND-ID-CCA. 6 Experiments on A Database
Setup of Experiments
The purpose of our experiments is to demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of our scheme. The instantiation of our novel IBEET-IA scheme is implemented in Java with the Java Pairing Based Cryptography library (JPBC) [4] . In our experiments, type A pairing is invoked for the configuration of our IBEET-IA program, which is symmetrically built from type A super-singular elliptic curve with the embedding degree of two. Precisely, the length of elements is 512 bits for G 1 and 1024 bits for G 2 . For the database, MySQL on a virtual machine with 1024MB memory and one processing core is used as the experimental environment. Detailed parameters of our experiments are shown in Table 1 . In addition, 
Performance Evaluation
In the following three experiments, the total time cost is linear with the size of entities to be encrypted, decrypted or tested. In Enc and Dec algorithms, they conduct a pairing and three exponents, simultaneously. Therefore, the average time consumption is the same, 0.3 second (or 0.3s) to 0.2s for each entity in the encryption and the decryption containing the reading and writing time. The average time consumption is 0.1s for each equality test, which is a reasonable result and can be accepted by practice applications. Table 4 . The time consumption of the Test algorithm is linear with the number of cells to be conducted the equality test. Test contains only two pairing computations. The deviation of the performance might be caused by the instability of the CPU used in our simulation.
Comparison
There are some PKEET variants. We made a comparison on the efficiency of algorithms adopted in these schemes. "Exp" refers to the exponent computation. "P" refers to the pairing computation. "Auth." refers to the authorization. The extended PKEET schemes cost three to four steps to conduct the equality test including analyzing trapdoor and inverse-computing trapdoor. In the contrast, our scheme only needs two pairing computations to conduct the equality test. The results in Table 5 indicate the improvement on efficiency in our scheme comparing with other schemes. In addition to efficiency, our scheme has shown the improvement on security and achieved the first W-IND-ID-CCA which is stronger than OW-ID-CCA.
Conclusions
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test proposed by Yang et al. in 2010 at CT-RSA and its extended works are vulnerable to the insider attack launched by the semi-trusted server by guessing on the embedding message. The server can test whether the guessed message is equal to that contained in the target ciphertext. To solve this problem, we proposed a novel IBEET-IA scheme which a reasonable efficiency. In order to prove that our scheme is chosen ciphertext secure, we proposed a novel W-IND-ID-CCA security model under the defined insider attack. We also demonstrated its efficiency by experiments on a real database.
